

## Message Text

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15

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 SAM-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NEA-09 SAB-01 /084 W

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R 011041Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9820

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 6065

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR FR UR

SUBJ: MITTERAND VISIT TO THE USSR

1. SUMMARY. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAS SHARED WITH US SOME OF ITS OWN VERY SPOTTY INFORMATION ON THE MITTERAND VISIT HERE APRIL 23-29. THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST TO EMERGE WERE ATTACKS BY BREZHNEV AND SUSLOV ON SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT OF THE SOCIALIST AND OTHER "MODERATE" PARTIES IN PORTUGAL; AND AN ALLEGED "OBSESSION" AT THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE SOVIET PARTY WITH CSCE. LITTLE SUBSTANTIVELY NEW ON CSCE APPEARED DURING THE VISIT, HOWEVER, EXCEPT FOR A FURTHER SIGN THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO SLIDE OFF THE CZECH PROPOSAL ON A CSCE FOLLOW-UP. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND A FRENCH EMBOFF HAVE BRIEFED US ON THE MITTERAND VISIT. BOTH SOURCES STRESSED THAT FRENCH EMBASSY CONTACT WITH THE MITTERAND GROUP HAD BEEN MINIMAL (NO EMBASSY

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REPRESENTATIVE AT THE AIRPORT FOR THE MITTERAND ARRIVAL, FOR

EXAMPLE, AND NO CONTACT BETWEEN MITTERAND AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR) AND THEIR INFORMATION WAS THEREFORE SPOTTY. THE EMBOFF SAID THAT HE OBTAINED ALL HE KNEW "THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE" (APPARENTLY PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH SOME MEMBER OF THE GROUP). HE ALSO EXPRESSED ASSURANCE THAT OUR EMBASSY IN PARIS COULD OBTAIN FULLER INFORMATION FROM SOURCES IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY.

3. THE EMBOFF SAID THAT THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE MITTERAND VISIT SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 14 HAD BEEN "BRUTAL," WITH NO EXPLANATION GIVEN OR APOLOGIES OFFERED. HE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A DELIBERATE SLIGHT INTENDED TO SHOW SOVIET UNCONCERN WITH PUBLICITY CAUSED BY PREVIOUS SOVIET POSTPONEMENTS OF VISITS BY MITTERAND, AND ALSO AS A REBUFF TO MITTERAND'S POSING AS A PRECONDITION FOR HIS TRIP THAT HE BE RECEIVED BY BREZHNEV. ONCE HERE, HOWEVER, THE EMBOFF ADDED, THE DELEGATION WAS QUITE SATISFIED WITH ITS TREATMENT. COMMENT: THE EMBOFF IN ASSERTING THAT THE POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE SNUB, INSISTED THAT THE CPSU PARTY PLENUM WHICH TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 16 WOULD NOT HAVE INTERFERED WITH THE VISIT AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. WE ARE NOT SO SURE ON THIS; WHILE WE DO NOT DISCOUNT ENTIRELY USE OF THE POSTPONEMENT DEVICE AS A FURTHER EXPRESSION OF SOVIET PIQUE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SCHEDULING OF THE PARTY PLENUM (AND THE PRE-PLENUM MANEUVERING WHICH LED TO THE DOWNFALL OF SHELEPIN) WAS IN FACT A PRIMARY REASON FOR THE DELAY. END COMMENT.

4. THE FRENCH EMBOFF SAID THAT THE MITTERAND GROUP FOUND SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV "OBSESSED" WITH CSCE. BOTH OF THE SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS READ LONG PREPARED STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT WHICH, HOWEVER, INTRODUCED NOTHING SUBSTANTIVELY NEW. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT MITTERAND WAS LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH HIS MEETINGS WITH SUSLOV AND THAT THE MEETING WITH PONOMAREV WAS EVEN LESS FRIENDLY.

5. THE EMBOFF HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ON MITTERAND'S DISCUSSION WITH BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT HE DID KNOW THAT BREZHNEV HAD BERATED MITTERAND ROUNDLY FOR THE ACTIONS THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL HAS UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF MODERATES IN PORTUGAL, BY IMPLICATION ATTACKING MITTERAND FOR HIS ASSISTANCE TO SOARES. CONFIDENTIAL

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BREZHNEV ALLEGEDLY SAID THAT SUCH ACTIONS SERVE ONLY TO "DRIVE PORTUGAL BACK INTO THE HANDS OF THE FASCISTS." THE EMBOFF SAID THAT SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV HAD MADE A SIMILAR PITCH, BUT IN A LOWER KEY. ALL THREE SOVIETS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR RESERVATIONS ABOUT WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

6. WE NOTE ONE POINT OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE COMMUNIQUE, MOST OF WHICH STRIKES US AS UNINTERESTING. MITTERAND, QUITE

AGAINST THE POLICY OF HIS OWN GOVERNMENT, BOUGHT THE SOVIET LANGUAGE (AS HE LARGELY DID ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES) ON A CSCE FOLLOW-UP: "BOTH SIDES ADVOCATE AGREEMENT ON FLIXIBLE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW CONSOLODATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FURTHER STEPS TOWARD TURNING EUROPE INTO A CONTINENT OF PEACE." IF INDEED THIS IS SOVIET LANGUAGE, USE OF THE WORD "FLEXIBLE PROVIDES FURTHER INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT AS WEDDED TO THE CZECH PROPOSAL ON THIS ISSUE AS THEIR FORMAL STANCE WOULD INDICATE.

7. PRAVDA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO CALLED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM "ALL" ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967. WE UNDERSTAND THAT MITTERAND HAS SINCE ISSUED A CORRECTION REMOVING THE WORD "ALL," CLAIMING AN ERROR IN TRANSLATION.  
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